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FUNDING AND MANAGING AMERICA’S
TRANSPORTATION SYSTEMS
So pervasive are transportation assets in a
modern industrial economy that, at one and the
same time, they are seen yet not seen---blending
into the everyday world as to be almost invisible
and only appreciated when, for whatever reason,
fail in their mission.

Introduction
America’s civilian, private sector transportation assets serve both the domestic
economy and military requirements while military transportation assets serve to insure
the nation’s security and national interests. The importance of transportation to the total
gross domestic product (GDP) and by extension to total gross national product (GNP) can
be appreciated by noting that final demand for transportation related components
comprise approximately 10 percent of GDP. (1) On the darker side, it should be noted
that of the recognized top ten terrorist targets in the United States, at least five are
transportation assets/infrastructure.
The importance of transportation to the military can hardly be overstated. No better
example of this importance is the role of transportation in World War II where
battlefronts were thousands of miles from the continental United States. This could also
be said of the Korean and Vietnam conflicts and the two Gulf (Iraq) wars.
Compared to other industrialized nations, the management and funding of America’s
transportation assets and infrastructure is unique. With regards to the “path” component
of three major transportation systems (highways, waterways, and airports and airways)
government (federal, state, and local) are the owners and decision-makers. There is a
federal Department of Transportation, 50 state departments of transportation together
with thousands of local transportation authorities. The vehicles that operate on these
paths are, for the most part, privately owned or military transportation assets. Railroad
track and right of way, with the exception of Amtrak’s northeast corridor and some lines
on military installations, and the great majority of pipeline miles in the United States, are
privately owned.
Since the nation’s founding there has always been debates about which level of
government and which department of government is responsible for what. In the early
1800s the federal government undertook the building of a national road to open the then
northwest territory. It was a toll road; never completed, and eventually responsibility for
its maintenance was left to the several states through which it passed. It was not until the
1920s that the federal government again became a major player in the nation’s highway
system. (2) And with respect to railroads, as the nation moved westward following the
War Between the States, federal and state land grants and loans to this transportation
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system became contentious issues. In the 21st century there is no lack of transportation
issues or lack of debate over their solution. Many are similar in nature to those of the 19th
century, the difference being the amount of money involved. (3)

Military Reliance on Civilian Transportation Assets
A unique aspect of American transportation is the degree to which the military
historically has depended on private sector transportation assets both in peacetime and
emergency situations.
During the American Revolution and the War of 1812 it was American privateers
(privately owned and armed merchant ships), as much as the American Navy, that
convinced England to grant independence to its North American colonies. In the Mexican
War of 1845 and the Spanish American War of 1898, the Army, having no sealift
capability, relied on privately owned ships to transport troops and supplies to Vera Cruz
and some 50 years later, troops and supplies to Cuba.
World War I exposed a glaring deficiency with respect to the country’s civilian
merchant fleet in its role as a naval and military auxiliary. In an attempt to remedy this
deficiency, the Merchant Marine Act of 1936 required that officers serving on subsidized
merchant ships, if eligible, be members of the merchant marine naval reserve and that
ships built with construction subsidies incorporate national defense features.
During World War II both the Army and Navy operated worldwide air transportation
systems. Both of these commands began with commercial planes and crews. The role of
the civilian-crewed merchant marine in moving military equipment and supplies to
combat theaters of operation thousands of miles from American ports cannot be
overstated. At the end of the war there were approximately 250,000 civilian merchant
seamen that served on over 3,000 ships. Their casualties, in percent terms, were only
exceeded by those in the Marine Corps.
In the Korean War, military airlift was supplemented by civilian aircraft. These assets
moved 56 percent of military cargo and 67 percent of military passengers. (4) In
recognition of the importance of civilian airlift supplementing military capability in an
emergency, the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) was established in 1951.
In both the Korean and Vietnam conflicts, civilian manned merchant ships augmented
military sealift capability. Both conflicts proved the value of the National Defense
Reserve Fleet (NDRF) that was created at the end of World War II and composed of
excess merchant and naval tonnage. (5) Management of this fleet was given to the U.S.
Maritime Commission, an independent civilian agency created with passage of the
Merchant Marine Act of 1936.
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Evolution of the Department of Defense Transportation Command
Recognizing the lack of a military sealift capability, at the end of the Spanish American
War of 1898, the War Department established the Army Transport Command with an
initial purchase of six British merchant-type vessels. (6) The Command’s initial task was
to transport troops to the Philippines to suppress a growing insurrection.
When the United States entered World War I the Army operated its own troop and
supply fleet with civilian crews but later turned the responsibility over to the Navy’s
newly established Naval Overseas Transport Service that later became the Naval
Transport Service. The Army Transport Service, however, remained a component in the
War Department’s Table of Organization.
During World War II both the Army and Navy operated worldwide air and ocean
transportation systems. For the Army it was the Air Transport Command and the Military
Transport Service. For the Navy, the Naval Air Transport Service and a naval auxiliary
fleet.
Following the end of World War II, emphasis changed from winning the war without
regard to cost, to developing a more efficient military establishment. It was in this context
that Congress passed the National Security Act of 1947 that established the Departments
of the Army, Navy and Air Force subordinate to a Department of Defense.
In successive moves to insure the efficient management of military transportation, in
1948 the Navy’s Naval Air Transport Service was combined with the Army’s Air
Transport Command to form the Military Air Transport Service (MATS). In 1949, the
Military Sea Transport Service (MSTS) was created from the Naval Transport Service
and the Army Transport Service. In 1956 the Army was given responsibility for all land
military traffic management. In 1962 this responsibility was extended to include common
user military terminals. The designated agency was the Military Traffic Management and
Terminal Service (MTMTS).
Over the next three decades, MTMTS became the Military Traffic Management
Command (MTMC). One of its responsibilities was coordinating military requirements
with respect to the National Defense and Interstate Highway System.
In 1955, the Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of Government
noted that both the Army, Navy and Air Force were still operating cargo and passenger
services in addition to MATS operations. This was remedied in 1966 when MATS
became the Military Air Command (MAC). The new agency was given responsibility for
all DoD airlift services.
In 1979 the Joint Chiefs of Staff formed the Joint Deployment Agency (JTA) to
establish a single manager for deployment of American military forces. For a number of
reasons it failed in its purpose. In 1987 the Secretary of Defense ordered the
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establishment of a Unified Transportation Command that later became the U.S.
Transportation Command.
In 2004 military transportation is the responsibility of the U.S. Transportation
Command (TRANSCOM). This agency is the single owner/manager of DoD’s
distribution process. Subordinate units are the Surface Deployment Distribution
Command, the Military Sealift Command and the Air Mobility Command. The
Transportation Command reports to the Secretary of Defense through the Chairman, Joint
Chiefs of Staff,

Evolution of the U.S. Department of Transportation
Federal input with respect to private and state-owned transportation assets is
accomplished through the commerce clause of the U.S. Constitution that designates
interstate and foreign commerce as a responsibility of the federal government and “power
of the purse” as administered by Congress. The present U.S. Department of
Transportation (7) has evolved not unlike the Department of Defense U.S. Transportation
Command. Predecessor components that were housed in various cabinet level
departments included the Office of Steamboat Inspection, the Lighthouse Service, the
U.S. Bureau of Public Roads, the Civil Aviation Administration, the Civil Aeronautics
Board, the U.S. Shipping Board, the Maritime Commission, the Maritime Administration,
Urban Mass Transit Administration, and until 2003, the U.S. Coast Guard. (8)
The overriding purpose for collecting various civilian transportation administrations
under a single roof was economic efficiency, that is, giving responsibility for preparing
federal transportation budgets to one department as opposed to different agencies in
different cabinet level departments maximizing their budget requests without considering
the nation’s transportation needs as a whole.
In 2004 units within the U.S. Department of Transportation with direct dollar input into
the nation’s transportation infrastructure include the Federal Aviation Administration,
Federal Highway Administration, Federal Transit Administration, Federal Railroad
Administration and the Maritime Administration.

Coordination and Cooperation Between Military and Civilian
Transportation Entities
As noted above, there is a long history of military reliance on civilian transportation
personnel and assets in both peace and times of national emergency. In 2004 this
cooperation and coordination is more important than ever. First, civilian and military
transportation budgets are anything but small which mandates efficient use of
transportation funds in a time of a large federal debt and continuing annual federal
deficits. Second, transportation systems are high priority terrorist targets that demand
cooperation between all responsible military and civilian transportation agencies.
4

The evolution of a federal Department of Transportation and the Department of
Defense Transportation Command has not been without debate both in Congress and the
affected agencies. Notwithstanding, in 2004 it can be fairly said that there is a greater
degree of coordination and cooperation between civil and military transportation users
and various levels of government—federal, state and local—than ever before in our
history. The below list of cooperative efforts, while not exhaustive, clearly makes that
point
• Use of civilian seamen in manning a large part of the ocean tonnage needed in
military point to point service and the Navy’s underway replenishment
requirements.
• Use of civilian seamen in manning the military’s worldwide pre-positioned
logistics vessels.
• Use of civilian seamen to crew the military’s Ready Reserve Force (RRF) made
up of logistics support ships that are maintained in constant readiness to meet
military surge requirements. This fleet of 68 special purpose and roll on/roll off
vessels supported the 2003 military buildup that became Operation Iraqi Freedom.
• A historic example of military and civilian agencies working together is the
cooperation between the Army’s Corps of Engineers and state agencies in
insuring that America’s seaports and waterways are maintained to the degree
necessary to support both military and commercial requirements.
• Another example of inter-agency cooperation is the management and funding of
the RRF. Funding is by the Department of Defense; management is tasked to the
Department of Transportation’s Maritime Administration.
• Chartering of privately owned merchant ships by the Military Sealift Command
in peacetime and time of national emergency.
• Military call-up of privately owned merchant ships enrolled in the Maritime
Security Program in time of national emergency. (9)
• Use of civilian port facilities and equipment under the Voluntary Inter-modal
Sealift Agreement. This program is administered by the Maritime Administration.
• Military call-up of civilian-owned commercial aircraft enrolled in the Civil
Reserve Air Fleet program in time of national emergency. (10)
• Reliance on privately owned shipyards to meet the Navy’s building programs.
Reliance on privately owned aircraft manufacturers to meet Army, Navy and Air
Force plane requirements.
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• Use of Civil Air Patrol planes, pilots and personnel in search and rescue missions
and aerial reconnaissance for homeland security. The Civil Air patrol is the U.S.
Air Force auxiliary.
• Use of civilian U.S. Coast Guard Auxiliary boats and crews in search and rescue
operations and maritime security missions.
• Training of civilian merchant marine officers and seamen. During World War II it
was the responsibility of the federal government to recruit and train the thousands
of seamen needed to crew the largest merchant fleet in the nation’s history. Today
the recruitment and training of merchant marine officers and seamen is a shared
responsibility as between the federal government (Department of Transportation),
the several states and seamen unions. Funding the U.S. Merchant Marine
Academy is a responsibility of the Maritime Administration. This agency also
partially supports the operation of six state maritime schools. Graduates of both
the federal and state school, if eligible, may be commissioned in the U.S. Naval
Reserve. The Seafarers International Union’s Paul Hall Center for Maritime
Training and Education provides resident training for merchant seaman recruits as
well as a number of upgrade classes for experienced mariners. In the event of an
extended mobilization the Paul Hall Center will, in all probability, be the model
for federal training programs and facilities.
• Probably no better example of appreciation for the role of the civilian merchant
marine is the year in, year out testimony before Congress by armed forces flag
officers on the importance of the merchant marine in the context of national
security. The same could be said of military support of the Civil Reserve Air Fleet
and the Civil Air Patrol.
• Organizations such as the National Defense Transportation Association offer
forums for the exchange of ideas and concepts between members of the armed
forces and civilian managers of the nation’s transportation systems. The list of
NDTA sustaining civilian organization members is a veritable “Who’s Who”
among American transportation and transportation related companies.
With respect to administering transportation programs at the federal level, both civilian
and military, not much more can be done organization-wise. For certain there will always
be fine tuning within TRANSCOM and DOT with respect to programs, personnel, and
responsibilities and the inevitable in-house disputes, but major organizational changes are
not likely in the foreseeable future.
Thus, while the management of transportation programs can be considered reasonably
efficient at the operational level, i.e. managing the funds provided by Congress, such
cannot be said at the next level—the Congressional appropriation process. It is at this
level that efficiency gives way to politics. It is at this level that Congress will choose one
weapon system over another, in many cases depending on where the system will be built
and the number of jobs created in that state or congressional district rather than adhering
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to DoD recommendations, Where Senator X will trade his vote for funds to build a
subway system in a city in his state where the vote between political parties is evenly
divided. And in all too many cases, Congress will provide funds for a member’s pet
project that was not requested in the administration’s budget proposal. (11)

Some Multi-Billion Dollar Transportation Programs and Issues That
Deserve Analyses Devoid of Political Considerations
* What to do with a failed, government sponsored, passenger rail system, i.e., the
National Railroad Passenger Corporation (Amtrak)? This “for profit” corporation has yet
to come close to showing a profit by any measure; cannot project a profit in the
foreseeable future and has cost the taxpayer some $45 billion since its creation. Amtrak
has requested $1.8 billion for FY 2005.
To its credit, Congress has attempted to control Amtrak’s money hemorrhage. In 1997
it passed the Amtrak Reform and Accountability Act (PL-105-34). Its purpose was to
eliminate federal subsidies by the year 2002. Obviously, it was a failed attempt.
If it is granted that past billions of dollars spent on Amtrak are sunk costs and not
relevant to future decisions, the question becomes—What is the opportunity cost of
future billions spent on a failed transportation enterprise, that is, what more worthy
transport program(s) could the money fund?
* How to insure an efficient and profitable domestic and international passenger air
transport system? In October 2004, one major airline is operating under the protection of
bankruptcy law. Two other major carriers are on the brink of filing for bankruptcy
protection. These are the carriers that operate the long range, wide-bodied aircraft so
prized by the military in the CRAF program.
* Federal funding for mass transit systems. Annual funding has increased from
approximately $4.3 billion in 1995 to a requested $7.5 billion in FY 2005. In 2004 there
are 32 existing mass transit and light rail projects under construction. The Federal Transit
Administration has requested $1.5 billion to continue funding these projects including
funds for new starts. In retrospect, there are no better examples of cost overruns than in
mass transit projects. Nor is there more potential for “bringing home the bacon” to a
Congressman’s or Senator’s district or state. A case in point is the Central Artery Third
Harbor Tunnel Project, a project to relieve congestion in the city of Boston, MA. In 1985
the estimated cost was $2.5 billion. In 1996 the General Accounting Office estimated the
cost to be over $10 billion. (12) In 2004, the estimated completion date, total cost is
estimated at $14.475 billion. (13) The federal government’s share of this cost is 70
percent.
Advocates for mass transit funding argue that public transportation systems will
encourage Americans to limit the use of their automobiles which would be
environmentally friendly and limit the demand for fossil fuels. In support of their FY
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2005 budget request, the Federal Transit Administration stated that presently funded and
proposed mass transit projects, when completed, would carry over 243 million riders
annually. In assessing this projection, one should remember the continued projections of
Amtrak rider ship and its projections of future profitability, projections, however, that
failed to materialize.
* In FY 2004, the Federal Railroad Administration received $37 million to support next
generation, high-speed rail development. Its 2005 request was for $10 million. In terms of
comparative magnitude these amounts are small when contrasted with DOT’s 2004
request of $54.3 billion. (14) But just as Amtrak garners support from the Congress
because of the states and districts it serves, the potential for regional rail systems
becoming, next to highways, a favored vehicle for pork barrel horse-trading, is many
times greater. Seldom included in the calculations and projections of regional rail system
advocates is the question---If regional rail systems are demanded by the public and hence
potentially profitable, why the lack of interest by the nation’s private sector freight
railroads? A majority of Amtrak’s rail passenger service operates on freight railroad
tracks.
* A comprehensive review of the role the nation’s freight railroads play in the overall
U.S. transportation system is long overdue. The return of privately owned railroads from
the near disaster 1970s to a major component of the U.S. freight transportation system
has received little attention from Congress with the exception of periodic attempts at reregulation.
In 2004, with 70 percent of the trackage of the 1960s and half that in 1945, railroads
moved 42 percent of all inter-city freight yet their share of the revenue generated was less
than 10 percent. In 2003 the top 100 motor freight carriers had combined revenues of
$79.3 billion while the total freight revenue for all railroads was $35.4 billion. (15)
Railroads are a capital intense industry. Fifteen to eighteen percent of revenues earned
are earmarked for capital expenditures contrasted to 4-5 percent for U.S. manufacturing.
In 2004 railroads do not earn sufficient revenues to entirely fund needed capital projects.
(16) Between 1985 and 2002, the mean return on equity (ROE) for Class I railroads was
7.49 percent while the mean ROE for the Fortune 500 companies was 12.48 percent. (17)
Railroad track and right of way are underutilized assets. An estimated 50-60 percent of
present right of way could be double tracked. The feasibility and cost of this option
should be compared to the cost of increasing interstate highway capacity from 4 to 6 to 8
to 12 and beyond. (18)
* Future railroad mergers. From 1980 to 2001 there were 14 mergers between major
railroads. During this period average rail return on equity increased from under 4 percent
to 7.2 percent. In 2004 there are seven major North American railroads; five American
and two Canadian.
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In June 2001 the Department of Transportation’s Surface Transportation Board (19)
proposed new rules governing rail mergers. Under the old rules firms were required to
show that the proposed merger would preserve competition; under the proposed new
rules merging companies had to show how the merger would increase competition. (20)
Logic suggests that the STB’s position is that henceforth rail mergers will be considered
anti-competitive, i.e. that there a no further economic efficiencies to be gained by future
rail mergers.

Conclusion
Action on the FY 2005, $299 billion highway bill has been postponed until after
Congress returns in January 2005. With respect to highway transportation and
transportation policy in general, the Wall Street Journal, in a September 20, 2004
editorial observed:
Though (the bill) is not as gargantuan as
the Members (of Congress) once hoped, it
remains a pork-barrel monster that misallocates
taxpayer resources at a time of war…What’s
missing here is a policy debate. The interstate
highway system, which is why this logrolling
started 50 years ago, is effectively complete.
what we have now is a federal exercise in
shoving all manner of unrelated spending
under the “transportation umbrella.” (21)
While it is unlikely that Congress will give up log rolling and pork barrel politics, there
are precedents for providing individual members of Congress political cover in votes that
should put the national interest ahead of reelection politics.
The Balanced Budget and Emergency Control Act of 1986 established maximum
deficit amounts. If deficits exceeded these amounts, the President was required to issue a
sequester order to reduce all non-exempt spending by a uniform percentage.
The proposed closing of a military installation in a congressional district or state
historically has triggered objections by the affected Congressman or Senator. In the post
World War II era, and later in the post Cold War era, log rolling reached new highs, that
is, trading votes to block base closings without regard to DoD’s recommendations. In
1988 a first round of base closings was recommended by an independent Base
Realignment and Closing (BRAC) Commission, a commission created by Congress to
make such recommendations and, in effect, provide a degree of cover for representatives
from affected districts and states. The Act has been periodically extended, and as of 2004,
the net savings occasioned by closing surplus bases is estimated at $17.5 billion. In 2004
the Department of Defense estimates that 20-25 percent of military installations are
surplus and that a future $6 billion could be saved by base closings in the future. (22)
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While it cannot be said that the above imposed congressional restraints on
congressional spending have been implemented without exceptions, the legislation does
indicate that Congress is willing to give up some prerogatives and examine and act upon
independent recommendations made from a national interest viewpoint.
This paper concludes that the management and administration of transportation monies
appropriated by Congress, civilian and military, are about as efficient as can be expected
and that cooperation and coordination between civilian and military agencies in
maximizing use of the nation’s transportation systems leaves little to be desired. It also
concludes, as the Wall Street Journal notes, all manner of unrelated spending is taking
place under a “transportation umbrella.”
The recommendation made in this paper is creation of an independent National
Transportation Advisory Commission composed of individuals with acknowledged
transportation experience and expertise. The mechanics of appointment and confirmation
would be secondary to the board’s independence, that is, the acceptance of the board’s
recommendations as being non-partisan. Both civilian and military interests would be
represented. The Commission would annually review the state of our national
transportation system, set priorities, and make recommendations with respect to funding.
Should an advisory commission, as described above, not be possible for whatever
reasons, Congress could request the General Accounting Office, its investigative arm, to
issue an annual report on the state of transportation in the United States, including
funding priorities as well as its own recommendations with respect to new and existing
programs.
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NOTES
(1)

Final sales is gross domestic product (GDP) minus change in private
inventories.

(2)

The authority of the federal government to play a major role in developing a
highway system is found in Article 1, Sections 3 and 8 of the U.S. Constitution
which delegates to Congress the authority to “regulate commerce with foreign
nations, and among the several states and with the Indian Tribes” and to
“establish post offices and post roads.

(3)

The 2004 debate in Congress over the future of a federally funded national rail
passenger system is a case in point. In October 1970, to insure a rail passenger
system in the United States, Congress passed the Rail Passenger Service Act
which created a “for profit” National Railroad Passenger Corporation
(Amtrak). Among other things it insured competition for long distance bus
companies such as Greyhound and Trailways, companies, as it turned out, that
could ill afford a federally subsidized competitor.

(4)

Whitehurst, Clinton H., Jr. The Defense Transportation System: Competitor or
Complement to the Private Sector. (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise
Institute, 1976) p. 20.

(5)

In both the Korean and Vietnam wars, hundreds of government owned ships
that were in lay-up at NDRF anchorages were activated to supplement the
tonnage needed to support American forces in Asia.

(6)

The Defense Transportation System: Competitor or Complement to the Private
Sector. p. 13.

(7)

The United States Department of Transportation is a cabinet level department
established by Congress on October 15, 1966.

(8)

In 2003, the U.S. Coast Guard was transferred to the newly created Department
of Homeland Security.

(9)

The MSP program is one wherein privately owned shipping companies commit
their vessels to a military call-up in time of emergency as determined by the
Department of Defense. In return, federal subsidies are paid to the operators to
compensate for lower cost foreign flag competition. In 2004 there are 47 ships
in the program. In its FY 2005 budget DOT requested $98.7 million for the
MSP program.

(10)

As of January 23, 2003 thirty-three carriers had committed 927 aircraft to the
CRAF program. Of these, 593 were wide-bodied aircraft with a minimum
range of 3500 miles. These planes in time of emergency would augment the Air
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Mobility Command’s fleet of C-5, C-141 and C-17 long range aircraft. As a
program incentive, the federal government restricts bidding for its peacetime
business to airlines in the CRAF program or airlines that offer their planes but
are not in the program.
(11)

The exchange of political votes in the context of economic theory is analyzed
in The Calculus of Consent by James Buchanan and Gordon Tullock.
(University of Michigan Press, 1962).

(12)

U.S. Congress, House Report 104-631 Department of Transportation and
Related Agencies Appropriation Bill 1997.

(13)

Massachusetts Turnpike Authority, “Turnpike News” 2004. Technically, the
Central Artery Third Harbor Tunnel Project is funded as a highway program.
Argued here is that given the length (miles) and anticipated traffic flow, it can
fairly be classified as a mass transit project.

(14)

U.S. Department of Transportation, FY 2005 Budget in Brief-Federal Railroad
Administration.

(15)

Commercial Carrier Journal Magazine (August 2004) and American
Association of Railroads, Web Home Page-Statistics- (October 2004).

(16)

The most pressing capital improvements are replacing older terminals and
transfer points. Congestion at these points increases transit time between origin
and destination and are impediments to full utilization of the nation’s rail
network.

(17)

Association of American Railroads, Policy and Economics Department,
“Railroad Profitability.” (July 2003)

(18)

The Federal Highway Administration FY 2005 request for the Federal-aid
Highway Program was $33.6 billion.

(19)

The ICC Termination Act of 1995 removed numerous restrictive railroad
regulations administered by the ICC. Remaining regulatory authority was
transferred to the Department of Transportation’s Surface Transportation
Board.

(20)

The proposed new rule came about after an appellate court upheld and earlier
STB 15 month moratorium on new rail mergers following a proposed
Burlington Northern-Santa Fe-Canadian National railroad merger. The merger
was later called off by both roads citing that the delays and uncertainty were
not in their shareholders best interest.

(21)

Wall Street Journal. “Highway Jobbery.” September 2004) p. A20.
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(22)

Levin, Carl U.S. Senator. Web site. “On the Issues-Base Closures.”
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